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1. vIenna 1872
rudolf von Jhering’s international hit Der Kampf um’s recht1, first published 
in 1872 and translated into english in 18792, bore the motto “Im Kampfe sollst du 
dein Recht finden”. In the preface to the first German edition, the author announced 
a “piece of psychology of law” which made it necessary for the legal subject, be 
it an individual or a nation, to fight for its right with the aim of finding “[its] own 
personality, [its] feeling of legal right, [its] self-respect”. In the midst of this 
struggle, law was “not mere theory, but living force”, a process of “research, 
struggle, fight, in short toilsome, wearying endeavour”7. through unconditional 
involvement in the struggle, the combatant created his own right, but also law as 
such. Only by struggling, on the other hand, could he succeed in establishing 
himself as a person.
* Prof. Dr, georg-august-universität göttingen.
** Dr, georg-august-universität göttingen.
1 r. von Jhering: Der Kampf um’s recht, vienna 1872.
2 r. von Jhering: The Struggle for law, chicago 1879.
 Ibidem, p. I. The words “In battle you shall find your right” are curiously absent from the English translation. 
Unless otherwise indicated, translations are provided by the authors.
 Ibidem, p. V.
 r. von Jhering: The Struggle for law, Chicago 1879, p. 26.
 Ibidem, p. 1.




As it was previously stated8, Jhering’s theory of law had its starting point in 
a very personal fight: a court case. Whilst hardly any traces of this can be found 
in the published version of The Struggle for law9, Jhering’s farewell lecture which 
had been delivered in Vienna in February 1872 and which had formed the basis of the 
book, had apparently contained a vivid account of the episode. It has been handed 
down to us in two slightly different versions, one of which was published in the Vien-
nese journal gerichtshalle. Here, the account of the event was given as follows:
“I myself have had occasion to feel that bitterness [i.e. a violation of Rechts-
gefühl]. It was a case that involved my maidservant. She suddenly wanted to leave, 
asserted that she had terminated her employment, but she had not given notice. There 
was nothing I could do. I sought help from the police; the girl was interrogated and 
confessed that she had not given notice, but insisted that she did not wish to con-
tinue her service; the police tell me: sue for compensation (continuing hilarity). And 
in court? The girl denies all and the police are but a singularis testis [i.e. a single 
witness, and therefore inadmissible in court] whose quality […] (increased hilarity). 
At that moment, I say, I felt the sting of injustice, when one has a proper right, and 
the institutions of the state are such that one cannot enforce this right, not with all 
the will in the world. And this is what I accuse the modern laws of, that they force 
a man with a strong sense of justice (Rechtsgefühl) to undertake the act of coward-
ice of which I spoke earlier, to forsake his proper right”10.
Another journal, the juristische Blätter, published the following account:
“I myself have once had occasion to feel bitterly injustice done to me. It was 
a case that involved one of my maidservants. Her lover went to America; she 
wanted to leave too, said she had terminated her employment, but had not done so. 
In court, they told me with a shrug: sue for compensation. It was then that I felt it 
first, felt the thorn of the injured right, and what it means when the institutions of 
the state are such that the injured man cannot assert his right!”11.
The “maidservant” referred to in these accounts was a young woman named 
Caroline Kuhl. She was born in Biedenkopf, a village about fifty kilometres north 
of Gießen, on 29 January 1839, as the seventh (and youngest) child of Emmanuel, 
a cobbler, and his wife, Anna Elisabeth12. She was employed in Jhering’s household 
in Gießen from 7 October 1862 to 6 October 1863. Soon thereafter, she sued her 
8 o. behrends: rudolf von jhering. Beiträge und Zeugnisse aus anlaß der einhundertsten wiederkehr seines 
Todestages am 17.9.1992, 2nd ed., Göttingen 1992, p. 69.
9 However, cf. ibidem, pp. 69, 120 et seq.
10 Gerichtshalle 16 (1872) no. 22, jhering in “juristischen gesellschaft”, 14 March 1872, pp. 95–99, 99, 
printed in: R. von Jhering: Der Kampf ums recht, H. Klenner (ed.), Freiburg (Breisgau) etc. 1992, pp. 107–131, 
128 et seq.
11 Juristische blätter 1 no. , jhering’s Vortrag in der juristischen gesellschaft, 17 March 1872, pp. 29–34, 33, 
printed in: R. von Jhering: Der Kampf ums recht, F. Ermacora (ed.), Frankfurt am Main [etc.], 1992, pp. 12–54, 45.
12 Hessisches Staatsarchiv Marburg (HStaM), Bestand Protokolle, no. II Biedenkopf 15 Mappe 3 and 
Heiratsprotokoll 1825, Bestand Protokolle, no. II Biedenkopf 16 Mappe 1.
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former employer for payment of her working wage (liedlohn) amounting to 12 guil-
ders — and won.
Despite the universal fame of Der Kampf um’s recht and the significance of 
Kuhl v. jhering with regard to its inception, no reconstruction of the case appears to 
have been attempted so far. In the middle section of this paper, we will present such 
a reconstruction, based on the court papers from the Jhering estate preserved at the 
Staats- und universitätsbibliothek (SUB) Göttingen. It will be followed by a short 
discussion of certain oddities which may or may not have led to Jhering’s defeat. 
The final chapter is devoted to the impact of the trial on the book. Why struggle? 
And who struggles for his or her law? 
First, however, we would like to provide some context.
2. gIessen 18
Gießen, where Jhering had served as a full-time university professor since 1852, 
was the capital of the province of Upper Hesse, “a hilly country, rather lacking in 
beautiful scenery”, as the 1872 Baedeker put it1, the northernmost of the three 
provinces of the Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt1. With about 850,000 inhabitants 
and an area of 8,345 km2, it was one of the smaller states of the Deutscher Bund or 
German Confederation, of which it had been part since the foundation in 1815.
The Grand Duchy was governed by the descendants of the House of Hesse. 
Upon his accession to the throne in 1806, the first Grand-Duke, Louis I, had dissolved 
the Provincial Diets. In 1820, a constitution was enacted and the Grand Duchy was 
transformed into a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral system, which lasted 
until 1918.
The territory of the Grand Duchy was severely fragmented, which was not 
conducive to political unity or economic development. The convergence to a single 
state was also hampered by the different legal traditions of the three provinces. 
French law was still in force in Rheinhessen, Starkenburg had a strong particular-
ist tradition and Oberhessen was largely a country of pure ius commune, i.e. the 
Roman law. In the nineteenth century, the Grand Duchy was renowned throughout 
Germany for its legal situation, second in its complexity only to the Kingdom of 
bavaria1.
1 K. Baedeker: Die Bahn durchschneidet die hessische Provinz oberhessen, ein hügeliges land ohne beson-
dere landschaftliche Schönheit (in:) K. Baedeker: Deutschland und Österreich. handbuch für reisende, 1th ed., 
Koblenz 1872, p. 367.
1 The other provinces were Starkenburg (capital: Darmstadt) and Rheinhessen (capital: Mainz).
1 g. Jung: Die zivilrechtliche Stellung der frau im großherzogtum hessen. Über die geschlechtervormund-
schaft im 19. jahrhundert, Diss. Darmstadt/Marburg 1997, p. 55. Cf. also W. Schubert: Der code civil und die 
Personenrechtsentwürfe des großherzogtums hessen-Darmstadt von 1842 bis 1847, ZRG Germ. Abt. 88 (1971), 
pp. 110–171.
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With about 10,000 inhabitants, Gießen was the most populous city in Upper 
hesse1. As the capital, it not only housed the administrative authorities of the prov-
ince and the county, but was also the seat of a hofgericht (court of appeals). At the 
municipal level, there was a Stadtgericht (town court) and a landgericht (regional 
court)17. Economically and culturally rather inconspicuous, Gießen was mainly 
known for its university, which had been founded in 1607. In the 1860s, its 
400 students were mainly taught by brilliant young professors, who, at the beginning 
of their careers, were not yet in a position to demand very high salaries. One of these 
professors was Jhering, 33 years of age at the time of his appointment18. He quickly 
gained fame as a successful author (volume 1 of Der geist des römischen rechts 
was just published), as an innovative teacher and a sought-after legal expert, and he 
became one of the most important members of the university with first-rate contacts 
throughout the city and province19.
According to Jhering’s son, Friedrich, their household in Gießen was rather 
large. Rudolf and his wife Ida had five children, all but one of whom were born 
there20. In 1862, the family lived in a rented flat at today’s 13 Liebigstraße. On 
6 October that year, the claimant-to-be, Caroline Kuhl, applied for a job as a maid-
servant. She was 23 and unmarried. Having signed the customary one-year tenancy 
agreement (miethvertrag), she started working in the Jhering household the follow-
ing day and remained there until the end of the agreed term. On 7 October 1863, she 
left. On this occasion, Jhering allegedly refused to “pay the outstanding wage of 
twelve guilders” and “hand over her Dienstbücher (service books) and heimathschein 
(certificate of nationality) which were still in his possession”21. The disagreement 
was preceded by a quarrel between Ida Jhering and Caroline Kuhl on the subject of 
“a box and a bedsheet”22. Shortly before Ms Kuhl’s departure in early October, Jher-
ing forced her to accompany him to the police station. There, he appealed to the 
highest-ranking police officer in the province, großherzoglicher Polizeirat, Lorenz 
Nover, of the rank of a Polizeicommissär erster classe2, for “assistance”2 in his 
1 Cf. A. Spiess: Das lahntal von seinem ursprung bis zur ausmündung nebst seiner nächsten umgebung, Ems 
1866, pp. 41 et seq.
17 J.g.K.e. Küchler: Die gesetzgebung des großherzogthums hessen, Darmstadt 1848, pp. 194–196.
18 On the appointment procedures, cf. D. Klippel: rudolf von jhering an der juristischen fakultät der ludwigs-
-universität gießen (1852–1868) (in:) O. Behrends: rudolf von jhering. Beiträge und Zeugnisse aus anlaß der 
einhundertsten wiederkehr seines Todestages am 17.9.1992, Göttingen 1992, pp. 31–37, 32.
19 Ibidem, pp. 33 et seq.
20 M. Kunze: rudolf von jhering — ein lebensbild (in:) rudolf von jhering. Beiträge und Zeugnisse aus anlaß 
der einhundertsten wiederkehr seines Todestages am 17.9.1992, Okko Behrends, Göttingen 1992, pp. 11–28, 14.
21 c. von Biedenkopf Prof. Dr. jhering zu gießen “[…] Auszahlung des rückständigen Lohnes mit 12 Gulden” 
and “die Aushändigung ihrer in seinem Besitze befindlichen resp. ihm übergebenen Dienstbücher (und ihres Hei-
mathscheines)”, 2 February 1864, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering.
22 “[…] eine Schachtel und Betttuch”. Replik i.S. Officialanwalts der Karoline Kuhl von Biedenkopf gegen Den 
hr. Professor jhering zu gießen, Beklagten, liedlohn betreffend, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (11).
2 hof- und Staatshandbuch des großherzogthums hessen 1863, Darmstadt 1863, p. 256.
2 Ibidem.
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dispute with the unruly maidservant. The legal assessment of this conversation and 
the exchange between Ida Jhering and Caroline Kuhl would become the main points 
of debate in the subsequent legal dispute.
It was preceded by the following letter which reached Jhering at the end of 
October 1863:
“Dearest Herr Professor!
Before taking the most difficult step of turning to the courts for legal assistance in 
reclaiming my remaining credit of 12 guilders, I implore you to spare me and cease 
refusing payment of my salary, as I terminated my contract with your wife in a timely 
manner and endured the year I had offered my services to you until the very last hour.
Every worker, as soon as he has done the work which is his duty, is indeed 
worthy of his salary, and I believe that I have fulfilled all my duties with you in time 
and consequently I deserve my hard-won wages.
By finally repeating my request addressed to you above, I commend myself to 
you with respect”2.
The letter was signed by Caroline Kuhl. Shortly thereafter, she took legal action 
by filing a suit with the Stadtgericht2. Since there was no gender tutelage in Gießen, 
she could do so without the aid of a legal guardian27.
. the trIal
A) PRIMARy PROCEEDINGS28
By appointment of the court, attorney Wilhelm Curtman was assigned to the 
claimant as her Official-Anwalt (official representative), according to the province’s 
poor laws29. Curtman, a son of the director of the teachers’ seminary at Friedberg, 
2 “Geehrtester Herr Professor!
Bevor ich den mir sehr schweren Schritt gerichtliche Hülfe zur Erlangung meines Restguthabens im Betrage 
von 12 Gulden von Ihnen zu erhalten in Anspruch nehme, erlaube ich mir vorerst in diesen Zeilen die Bitte an Sie, 
mich davon zu verschonen und mir die Auszahlung meines Lohnes nicht länger zu verweigern, indem ich Ihrer 
Frau gegenüber ja zeitig genug meinen Austritt aus Ihren Diensten ankündigte und ich auch das Jahr auf welches 
ich mich bei Sie vermiethete bis zur letzten Stunde ausgehalten habe. 
Es ist doch wohl ein jeder Arbeiter, sobald er die ihm obliegende Arbeit völlig verrichtet, seines Lohnes werth 
und ich glaube, daß ich allen meinen Obliegenheiten bei Ihnen pünktlich nachgekommen bin und demzufolge 
meinen Lohn sauer verdient habe.
Indem ich schließlich meine oben an Sie gerichtete Bitte wiederhole, empfehle ich mich Ihnen unter Hoch-
achtung”. Kuhl to Jhering, 28 October 1863, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2.
2 By 26 November 1863, the suit was already pending, cf. SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (36).
27 g. Jung: Die zivilrechtliche Stellung der frau im großherzogtum hessen. Über die geschlechtervormund-
schaft im 19. jahrhundert, Diss. Darmstadt/Marburg 1997, p. 131.
28 Terminology according to O. Bülow: gemeines deutsches Zivilprozessrecht. Vorlesungsnachschrift von 
l. fechler aus dem wintersemester 1868/69, Tübingen 2003, pp. 180 et seq.
29 Resolutum, 27 December 1863, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms Jhering 10:2 (38). Jhering was notified on 
31 December. The legal basis was a law dated 29 March 1836, “das Armenrecht in den Provinzen Starkenburg und 
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was 31 at the time0. He had studied in Gießen and Heidelberg1 and was one of the 
youngest lawyers accredited to the hofgericht2. In his statement of claim, he de-
manded “payment of a liedlohn of twelve guilders, together with the interest due 
from the initiation of the proceedings, the documents currently in his [Jhering’s] 
possession sine causa, and payment of the legal costs”. He based his demands on 
the fact that the one-year term of service, to which his client had consented, expired. 
Jhering’s statement of defence is missing from the files. It can, however, be recon-
structed from Curtman’s reply. Jhering claimed that his wife had negotiated “con-
tinuation of the tenancy (i.e. service) agreement” with Caroline Kuhl before 
Pentecost, and the latter had agreed to extend the tenancy beyond the termination 
date. In a note written at the time, Jhering stated:
“Before the Feast of St. John (June 24, termination date, moving date) my wife 
said to the girl that if she wished to leave by Michaelmas [29 September], she should 
say so by St. John’s day, that my wife was willing to abide by her will, whereupon she 
stated: I have no intention to leave, there is nothing to gain from changing positions”.
It was only in the dispute with her mistress on Pentecost (May 24) that the 
claimant changed her mind. Once again Jhering:
“It was at least four or five weeks later, if not more, that my wife chided her for 
a gross misbehaviour, and she [Caroline] expressed her wish to leave saying, accord-
ing to my wife: If you are not satisfied, feel free to look for another girl […]”.
Oberhessen betreffend” (in:) nachträge zur hessen-Darmstädtischen civil-Processordnung vom jaher 1724 und 
Peinlichen gerichts-ordnung vom jahr 1726 mit Supplementen v. Darmstadt. 130, Philipp Bopp, Darmstadt 1839, 
pp. 88–122.
0 Academische Monats-Hefte 10 (1893), no. 112, pp. 188–189. (Christian Ludwig Karl) Wilhelm Curtman 
was born in Worms on 24 February 1833. His parents were Wilhelm Jakob Georg, a well-known educator, and 
Sophie Louise, née Gebhard. On 1 November 1864, he got married in Friedberg near Gießen where he lived 
and worked. His wife was Maria Anna Rosine Schaeffer, the daughter of Georg Karl Friedrich and Anna Maria, 
née Sebastiani. Curtman died on 21 July 1893 in Gießen, where he lived since his retirement.
1 W. Hoffmann: cubiculum latinum, Einst und Jetzt 25, 1980, pp. 169–179, 169. Curtman, “a highly edu-
cated man, whose Latin was as good as his German”, first registered in Gießen on 14 May 1850, cf. the register of 
enrolments and inscriptions at the University of Gießen, WS 1807/08 — WS 1850, compiled by Franz Kössler, 
pp. 29. There he became an active member of the corps Teutonia student fraternity (rec. 1851), and also of the 
corps rhenania in Heidelberg (rec. 1852). In his old age, he was awarded great honours in respect of both, for 
instance as a founder of the so-called cubiculum latinum in gießen.
2 hof- und Staatshandbuch des großherzogthums hessen 1863, Darmstadt, Verlag der Invalidenanstalt 1863, 
p. 386. “In der Theorie des Rechts und in seiner practischen Anwendung war er gleich bewandert”, Obituary, 
Academische Monats-Hefte 10 (1893), no. 112, pp. 188 et seq.
 Complaint dated 2 February 1864, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms Jhering 10:2 (12) “[…] Zahlung des Liedlohnes 
mit 12 Gulden nebst Proceßzinsen von der Klagemittheilung an und die sine causa in seinen Händen befindlichen 
Urkunden schuldig zu erkennen unter dessen gleichzeitiger Verurtheilung in die Prozeßkosten”.
 “[…] Fortsetzung des Mietvertrags verhandelt”, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (11).
 “Vor Johannis (24 Juni: Kündigungs-, Zugtermin) sagte meine Frau dem Mädchen: sie solle, wenn sie 
Michaelis fort wolle, zu Johannis kündigen, meine Frau sei dies bei Willen ihren Wünschen, worauf sie äußerte: 
ich habe nicht die Absicht fortzugehen, mit dem Wechseln kommt Nichts heraus”. Note in Jhering’s hand, undated, 
SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (18).
 “Vier bis fünf Wochen oder noch länger, als meine Frau ihr Vorstellungen gemacht hatte wegen einer groben 
Ungehörigkeit äußerte sie ihren Willen zu gehen, u zwar, wie meine Frau meint, in der Weise: Wenn Sie nicht 
zufrieden sind, können Sie sich ja nach einem andern Mädchen umsehen […]”. Ibidem.
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In Jhering’s view, the notice therefore came too late, because after 24 June. 
Accordingly, the contractual relationship was automatically extended to the next 
regular termination date at the end of the year. Because of the claimant’s breach of 
contract, he maintained, he incurred a loss of four guilders for the employment 
of a substitute, which he in turn demanded from the claimant.
In his reply, attorney Curtman denied the existence of such an agreement and 
the allegation that his client “had left her employment contrary to the terms of the 
contract, that she was still employed and that she had terminated too late”7. even 
police commissioner Nover, he maintained, had not succeeded in persuading her to 
stay on until the end of the year8. For the same reasons, he also denied the claim 
for compensation.
Some time later, as the summer months passed, the Stadtgericht issued an in-
terlocutory decision whereby the defendant, in view of the “closed procedure and 
rejected settlement […]within an expiry period of 14 days”9 was ordered to prove 
his allegations, namely:
“— that the continuation of the tenancy agreement after 6 October 1863 had 
been agreed between his wife and the claimant on Pentecost last year and that it 
could be terminated but quarterly on 1 January, 1 April, 1 July and 1 October and 
that this should have occurred three months earlier, and also, as regards the com-
pensation claim, that the defendant, after the applicant’s leaving the service, had 
been forced to employ another servant, and thus had been forced to pay four guilders 
more — after which further decision is to be made with regard to the merits and the 
costs”0.
This was the judgement of evidence (Beweisurteil) which ended the first part 
of a ius commune civil action with the official closing of the files (aktenschluss)1. 
the Stadtgericht had been presented with the relevant facts, had subjected them to 
an initial legal examination, had found them somewhat deficient and was, therefore, 
unable to reach a Definitiverkenntnis, a final verdict. According to the general prin-
ciples of evidence, the court thus imposed the burden of proof on the party for which 
the modification of the contract was favourable, in this case Jhering. The two-week 
7 “[…] daß sie contractwidrig weggehe, daß sie weiter gemiethet und zu spät gekündigt habe”. Reply, 21 May 
1864, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (11).
8 Ibidem, 10:2 (11).
9 “[…] binnen rechtszerstörlicher Frist von 14 Tagen”, Ruling dated 7 July 1864, SUB Göttingen Cod. 
Ms Jhering 10:2 (33).
0 “[…] daß bezüglich der Fortsetzung des Miethvertrags nach dem 6. October 1863 etwa um Pfingsten v[origen] 
J[ahres] zwischen seiner Ehefrau und der Klägerin verabredet sei, daß diese nur quartaliter zum 1. Januar, 
1. April, 1. July und 1. October den Dienst verlassen könne und zu diesem Zweck ¼ Jahr vorher deshalb zu 
kündigen habe — ferner bezüglich der Entschädigungsforderung daß Beklagter nach dem Dienstaustritt der 
Klägerin bis zu Ende des Jahres durch Miethung eines anderen Dienstboten an Lohn für diesen 4 Gulden mehr als 
Klägerin erhielt, aufgewendet habe — wonach weitere Entscheidung in der Hauptsache und über Kosten erfolgen 
soll”. Ibidem, 10:2 (33).
1 O. Bülow: gemeines deutsches Zivilprozessrecht (in:) Vorlesungszeitschrift von l. fechler aus dem winter-
semester 1868/69, Tübingen 2003, pp. 200 et seq.
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period prescribed by the Hesse-Darmstadt Code of Civil Procedure of 1724 was 
a Präklusionsfrist, a limitation period2, a fact which was about to prove much to 
the detriment of Jhering.
B) PROCEEDINGS FOR THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE
The next stage of the civil action was the so-called Beweisverfahren, the pro-
ceedings for the taking of evidence, during which the party charged with the burden 
of proof had to provide the required evidence. The proceedings were governed by 
a strict set of rules: if the burdened party’s evidence succeeded completely in con-
vincing the court, conviction would immediately follow; if it failed to do so, there 
would be an acquittal. However, if the court found the evidence “only more than 
half convincing”, the party with the burden of proof had to swear an erfüllungseid 
(oath of completion) in order to win the case. If the court thought the proof “less 
than half” convincing, a reinigungseid (oath of purification) was required. It was 
sworn by the opposing party and sealed its victory. In other words, conviction and 
acquittal were always subject to the swearing of an oath, following the final verdict, 
the endurteil.
In this case the complex set of rules played out as follows: in order to deliver 
the first statement of proof, i.e. the existence of a contractual agreement between his 
wife and the claimant, Jhering called the police commissioner Nover to give evidence. 
Nover’s hearing took place on 29 September 1864:
“On this day, the Grand-Ducal police commissioner Nover appears and declares, 
as properly instructed: My name is Lorenz Nover, Roman Catholic, police officer 
here, 52 years old, ad rem. It was in October last year, around the beginning of the 
month, that the defendant came to my office with the claimant, because, as I was 
informed by them, they were in dispute over the duration of the tenancy agreement 
of the claimant. It is customary here that in the case of an employment contract of 
unlimited duration the service can be terminated only on Michaelmas, Christmas, 
although there is no express agreement. I only remember that at that time the plain-
tiff declared, etc.”.
2 P. Bopp: hessen-Darmstädtische civil-Prozessordnung vom jahr 1724 und Peinliche gerichts-ordnung vom 
jahr 1726 mit Supplementen, Darmstadt 1830, p. 50.
 O. Bülow: gemeines deutsches Zivilprozessrecht (in:) Vorlesungszeitschrift von l. fechler aus dem winter-
semester 1868/69, Tübingen 2003, pp. 234 et seq.
 “Im heutigen Termin findet sich der Großherzogl. Polizeirath Nover ein und erklärt, sachgemäß instruirt: Ich 
heiße Lorenz Nover, katholisch, Polizeirath dahier, 52 Jahre alt, ad rem. Es wird im October v[origen] J[ahres], 
etwa zu Anfang dieses Monats gewesen sein, als der Beklagte mit der Klägerin zu mir auf mein Geschäftsbüreau 
kam, weil sie Beide, wie ich von ihnen mitgetheilt erhielt, über die Dauer des Miethvertrags der Klägerin in Streit 
sich befanden. Ueblich ist es hier, daß bei einem Dienstvertrag auf unbestimmte Zeit, doch der Dienstaustritt nur 
auf Michaeli, Weihnachten, obwohl hierüber gerade keine ausdrückliche Anordnung besteht. Ich erinnere mich 
nur, daß damals der Kläger erklärte etc.”. SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (16). 
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Nover, it became clear, could not give direct evidence, but moved, as attorney 
Curtman slyly remarked, “from the field of actual perception to that of conclusion 
or even conjecture”. In the alleged exchange between the two parties, he went on, 
there had apparently been “not the slightest indication that the claimant had actu-
ally been questioned” about the matters at hand. After that, the witness appeared 
once more in court, but to no avail. The court’s final verdict duly stated that Jher-
ing’s witness:
“failed to confirm that the claimant had actually declared that the tenancy 
agreement with the defendant had been concluded, but merely stated his private 
opinion that he had taken as much from her behaviour. This argumentation, therefore, 
cannot be considered consistent with the Erfüllungseid […]”7.
At this point of the proceedings, Jhering was in deep trouble. What saved him 
from immediate conviction was the court’s findings concerning the second statement 
of proof, the compensation claim. Here, Jhering named Kuhl’s successor, one 
Elisabeth Müller, as a witness. The court considered her testimony as sufficient, 
stating:
“that the argument of the defendant so far as the same was attempted by 
a witness is to be regarded as unsuccessful for the first proof of evidence, but that 
the second proof was to be accepted […]”8.
In avoiding Jhering’s immediate conviction, the court caused some confusion. 
There could only have been a claim for compensation under the second statement 
of proof if there had been a breach of contract in the sense of the first, whose dem-
onstration just failed. Nevertheless, the court’s verdict entered into legal force, as 
Jhering did not lodge an appeal or demand re-entry into the proceedings.
C) THE FINAL STAGES OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Still, the argument by oath had to be made. The verdict being clear with regard 
to the first statement, the court had not yet decided which party should be called up 
to take an oath: would the claimant take a reinigungseid or her adversary an erfül-
lungseid? Thus, at the end of the period of appeal, attorney Curtman demanded 
that:
 “[…] vom Felde der thatsächlichen Wahrnehmungen auf das der Schlußfolgerungen oder gar der Vermut-
hungen”, Impugnationshandlung, 22 November 1854; SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (14).
 Resolutum, 9 January 1865, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (19).
7 “[…] nicht zu bestätigen, daß Klägerin den von der Beklagten Seite behaupteten Miethvertrag als wirklich 
abgeschlossen zugestanden habe, vielmehr nur seine individuelle Ansicht dahin äußert, daß er aus ihrem Benehmen 
eine solche Folgerung gezogen, hiernach aber die Beweisführung auch nicht bis zum Erfüllungseid erbracht 
angenommen werden kann […]”, Entscheid, 11 February 1865, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (21).
8 “[…] daß der Beweis des Beklagten zum ersten Beweissatz, soweit derselbe durch einen Zeugen versucht 
wurde, für mißlungen zu erachten, der zweite Beweissatz aber als bis zum Erfüllungseid erbracht anzunehmen sei, 
unter Aussetzung der Entscheidung über die Prozeßkosten”. Ibidem.
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“the defendant be forced to swear the oath with regard to the first statement 
within the prescribed period of time, otherwise he should be precluded”9.
As an alternative, Curtman proposed that his client would take a reinigungseid, 
thus making any erfüllungseid on Jhering’s part redundant0. And so it happened: 
a court hearing was arranged for Caroline Kuhl to “take the deferred reinigungseid 
sub præsentibus legibus […] on the morning of 10 April 1865, at 11 o’clock”1. her 
adversary’s defeat was now imminent, which makes the ensuing powerplay on his 
part at least partially understandable.
Jhering, in an increasingly frantic effort to prevail, now brought to bear all his 
social prestige and standing as a Grand-Ducal professor and renowned jurist. With 
the generous support from the competent judge, assessor carl bott, caroline Kuhl’s 
court appointment to take the reinigungseid was deferred and yet another round of 
settlement negotiations commenced. Jhering, his wife and judge Bott took turns in 
once again urging the claimant to acknowledge her guilt and abandon her claim. The 
relevant minutes are missing from the file in Jhering’s estate; attorney Curtman’s 
angry reply, however, has survived. It deserves to be quoted in full:
“With regard to the events of 10 April this year, strange news has come to my 
ears, so strange that one might doubt its truth.
First of all, I would like to call attention to the fact that, according to our leg-
islation, a poor maidservant and a Privy Councillor of Justice, together with his wife, 
are perfectly equal before the law; accordingly, a maidservant must be allowed to 
take her oath even if this means that a professor of jurisprudence loses his court case 
and a police commissioner has given evidence. The hearing on the tenth of this 
month was intended precisely for the taking of the oath, because, according to your 
Honour, the defendant did not succeed in delivering proof. My client, according to 
the reports I have been given, was quite willing to take the oath, but she could not 
get to it because of all the talk about settlement and dire warnings against perjury. 
However, she has not given her consent to the settlement. The claimant herewith 
declines any solicitation of settlement and wishes to be spared further requests for 
conciliation, while the defendant’s right to lodge a plea for perjury remains unaf-
fected. If it should be true that even the reporting judge urged my client to admit her 
guilt, since she would not be burdened with any costs, I would like to state that I am 
prepared to forgo half of my attorney’s fee in favour of Privy Councillor Jhering, as 
long as my client receives her money in full.
Apart from that, I am seriously concerned that a further delay in the proceed-
ings and the taking of the oath would necessitate a complaint of the sharpest criticism 
9 “[…] dem Herrn Beklagten aufzugeben nunmehr innerhalb bestimmter Frist bezüglich des ersten Beweis-
satzes von dem vorbehaltenen Eide Gebrauch zu machen, gegenfalls er damit ausgeschlossen würde”. Vortrag, 
March 13, 1865, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (24).
0 Ibidem.
1 “[…] den ihr über den Vorbeweis deferirten Eid sub præsentibus legibus auszuschwören”. Ibidem.
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with the Hofgericht of the province of Upper Hesse, to which the case, together with 
witness statements concerning the events that occurred on the tenth day of this month, 
will be presently referred if I am not immediately provided with a satisfactory de-
cision”2.
He resubmitted his request on 22 April. However, the court, following a request 
made by Jhering, ordered the temporary suspension of the oath proceedings in order 
“to give the claimant time to examine her conscience”. In the same ruling, attorney 
Curtman’s remarks were considered “highly superfluous and ineffective, […] 
highly unsuitable and tactless”. It was not until 9 May that a new date was set. 
Before taking her oath, Caroline Kuhl was then ordered to see a clergyman who 
would explain to her in more detail the concept of taking an oath and the spiritual 
dangers involved in committing perjury. This specific measure was imposed on 
the basis of an obscure ministerial decree of 1813; in practice, however, “the oath 
taker was only required to let a clergyman explain the importance of the oath if the 
opponent expressly demanded it”, as a contemporary commentary on the pertinent 
article (§ 8) of the hessen-Darmstädtische civil-Process-ordnung (Code of Civil 
Procedure) put it7. Now Jhering pulled out all the stops.
He even took up the pen himself. In a lengthy writ dated 24 May 1865, he 
expatiated on the legal significance of Caroline Kuhl’s silence in answer to his wife’s 
notice. His ample remarks on the topic of tacit approval according to Roman law 
were supported by examples concerning the role of facta concludentia with pro 
2 “Ueber die Vorgänge im Termin des 10[.] April dieses Jahres sind mir sonderbare Dinge berichtet worden, 
so sonderbar, daß sie mich fast an deren Wahrheit zweifeln laßen möchten.
Zunächst möchte ich darauf aufmerksam machen, daß nach unserer Gesetzgebung eine arme Magd und ein 
Geheimer Justizrath sowie deßen Frau Gemahlin vor dem Gesetze ganz gleich sind, daß demnach auch eine Magd 
zum Eide zugelassen werden muss, selbst wenn ein Professor der Jurisprudenz dadurch den Prozess verliert und 
ein Polizeirath Zeugniß abgelegt hat. Der Termin am 10. diesen Monats war aber, weil der Herr Beklagte seinen 
Beweis nach Ansicht verehrlichster Stelle nicht erbracht hatte, zur Eidesleistung bestimmt. Meine Mandantin war 
ferner nach dem mir gegebenen Berichte durchaus bereit, den Eid zu leisten, konnte aber vor ihr aufgedrungener 
Vergleichsprojecten und Meineidsverwarnung nicht dazu kommen, obwohl sie trotzdem ihre Einwilligung zum 
Vergleich nicht ertheilt hat. Die Klägerin lehnt hiermit jeden Vergleich ab und ich bitte, sie mit weiteren Vergleichsan-
suchen zu verschonen. Eine Anklage wegen Meineids bleibt dem Herrn Beklagten dann immerhin unbenommen. 
Wenn es wahr sein sollte, daß sogar von Seiten des Herrn Respicienten Assessor Carl Bott bemerkt worden ist, die 
Klägerin möge bei einem Vergleiche nur ihre Kosten übernehmen, sie brauche ja doch nicht zu bezahlen, so will 
ich mir erlauben, beizufügen, daß ich im Falle eines Vergleichs, wobei die Klägerin ihr alles Geld erhält, bereit bin, 
dem Herrn Geheimen Justizrath Jhering die Hälfte meiner Kosten nachzulaßen.
Im Uebrigen aber mache ich ernstlich darauf aufmerksam, daß eine weitere Verzögerung des Verfahrens und 
der Eidesleistung durch die schärfste Kritik beim Großherzoglichen Hofgerichte der Provinz Oberhessen gerügt 
werden müßte, an das die Sache augenblicklich mit Benennung der Zeugen über das Verfahren vom 10. diesen 
Monats abgegeben werden wird, wenn nicht sofort zufriedenstellende Verfügung an mich als den Officialanwalt 
der Klägerin ergeht […]”. Vortrag, 15 April 1865, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (4).
 Auferlegte Erklärung, 22 April1865, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (5).
 Resolutum, 22 April 1865, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (4).
 Ibidem.
 Resolutum, 9 May 1865, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (s.n.).
7 P. Bopp: hessen-Darmstädtische civil-Prozessordnung vom jahr 1724 und Peinliche gerichts-ordnung vom 
jahr 1726 mit Supplementen, Darmstadt 1830, p. 59.
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herede gestio. Finally, he expressed the hope that the court would regard his scien-
tific proof “as given”, dismiss his opponent’s oath as “redundant” and rule in “the 
sense which I have outlined”8. He also demanded restitution and, in an increas-
ingly erratic hand, offered further factual evidence on the conduct of the claimant 
at the hearing of 10 April, calling none other than judge Bott to give evidence9. all 
this was highly inconsistent with the fact that the Beweisverfahren had long been 
closed, preclusion had occurred and the period of restitution had expired. Lastly, 
Jhering angrily rejected attorney Curtman’s mock offer regarding his legal fee:
“I do not know what gave him [i.e. Curtman] the confidence to dare make me 
such an offer. I can therefore only see this as an expression of his own judgment as 
to the value of his own pleadings delivered in this case. In any case, it pleases me 
that I will not be forced to accept the offer of half (the poor salary) from a lawyer 
for the poor”0.
The trial subsequently came to an abrupt end. On 3 July 1865, Caroline Kuhl, 
in the presence of her lawyer, was allowed to take a reinigungseid. Four days later, 
the court ruled: 
“that the defendant’s argument has been considered to be unsuccessful, and 
that he is ordered to pay the sum of twelve guilders in wages with 5% interest from 
23 February 1864, onwards, to return the claimant’s service book and certificate of 
nationality and to bear the costs of the proceedings”1.
The last document in the file is a receipt:
“In the case of Karoline Kuhl from Biedenkopf, claimant, against the Grand 
Ducal Professor, Privy Councillor of Justice, Dr. Jhering, of Gießen, defendant, 
concerning a claim of 17 guilders, 54 kreuzer in taxes and 1 guilder, 52 kreuzer in 
insinuation fees, 19 guilders, 46 kreuzer in total, which the defendant has paid 
in full. Gießen on 15 September 1865. Grand Ducal Stadtgericht Gießen. Muhl”2.
8 “Ich gebe mich der Hoffnung hin, dass diese in dem von mir entwickelten Sinn ausfallen u. demgemäß mein 
Beweis als erbracht, der Eid der Clägerin aber für überflüssig erklärt werde”. Erklärung und Antragstellung, 
24 May 1865, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (1).
9 Ibidem.
0 “Ich weiß nicht, wodurch ich ihm d.h. Curtman den Muth gemacht habe, meinerseits es verschuldet habe, 
daß er es wagt, mir ein solches Anerbieten zu machen und kann daher darin nur den Ausdruck … seines eigenen 
Urtheils über den Werth seiner in dieser Sache gelieferten Proceßschriften erblicken, jedenfalls freue ich mich, in 
der Lage zu sein, das Anerbieten des halben Armenrechts von Seiten eines Armenadvokaten nicht annehmen zu 
brauchen”. Ibidem.
1 “[…] daß die Beweisführung des Beklagten für mißlungen zu erachten und derselbe zur Zahlung der libel-
lirten zwölf Gulden Lohn mit 5% Zinsen vom 23. February 1864 an schuldig sei, auch das Dienstbuch der Klägerin 
und deren Heimathschein an diese herauszugeben und die Prozeßkosten zu tragen habe”. Urtheil, 7 July 1865, SUB 
Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (41).
2 “In Sachen der Karoline Kuhl von Biedenkopf, Klägerin, gegen [den] Großherzoglichen Professor, Gehei-
men-Justizrath Dr. Jhering zu Gießen, Beklagten, wegen Forderung über 17 Gulden 54 Kreuzer fiskalische Taxen 
und 1 Gulden 52 Kreuzer Insinuationsgebühren — Summe 19 Gulden 46 Kreuzer, welche Beklagter anhier bezahlt 
hat. Gießen den 15. September 1865. Großherzogliches Stadtgericht Gießen. [signed by Stadtrichter Carl Theodor] 
Muhl”. Quittung, 25 September 1865, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 10:2 (43).
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In addition, there were the attorneys’ fees. It is not known whether Jhering 
accepted the discount so brazenly offered by Curtman.
. JherIng’s defeat
Jhering’s crushing defeat merits some explanation. How did it happen that one 
of the greatest lawyers of the nineteenth century was apparently not capable of as-
sessing his own chances in court? How was it that a legendary legal expert seemed 
to know so little about law procedures and their internal dynamics? How could Jher-
ing emphasize the importance of court practice and still so intensely despise his 
adversary and her legal representative? Answers to these questions may be found in 
some of Jhering’s less likeable character traits and perhaps also in his conduct dur-
ing the trial, which must be viewed against the background of his professional self-
image and his notions about rechtswissenschaft as a science. What is striking is not 
just the fact that he lost the case, but the nature and seriousness of his failure.
To begin with, Jhering’s apparent hesitation and delay in intervening in the 
procedure is quite noteworthy. Judging by the documents available, he only intro-
duced substantiated claims of his own at a very advanced stage when certain 
irrevocable steps had already been taken. This may have been due to his relative 
lack of practical experience; it also suggests that, to Jhering’s mind, court pleadings 
as such were not of primary importance. According to the beliefs of the Historical 
School, law, by virtue of its immanent spirit, was bound to emerge, regardless of 
deadlines or preclusions. The notion that the dispute could be decided not by apply-
ing the scientific methods of carving out legal truths from normative texts but by 
court proceedings within a specific timeframe and a fixed set of procedural rules 
seemed quite alien to him. Taken to its extreme, this epistemology of law would 
actually render trials obsolete. In reality, however, Jhering’s expectations would be 
played out not in the spirit world of the Historians, but in a simple courtroom. Here, 
the great jurist was woefully out of his depth. The reasons for Jhering’s unshakeable 
belief that he was in the right against his former maidservant and his profound mor-
tification at the defeat, which was still palpable in 1872, lie precisely in this peculiar 
displacement in his actions and expectations, in the failed transition from his accus-
tomed social role of civil law professor to the role of defendant in a civil action.
Besides the confusion in his own situation between two different frameworks 
of law, i.e. “law in books” and “law in action”, Jhering fell victim to yet another 
displacement, resulting in a grave error in substantive law. His main argument dur-
ing the trial was the contractual duty to terminate on the part of his opponent. But 
 This famous distinction was introduced as late as 1910 by the chief propagator of Jhering’s ideas in Ameri-
ca, Roscoe Pound (law in books and law in action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12 1910).
Inge Kroppenberg, nikolaus linder: Domestic trials, and The Struggle for law…
0
why would someone in Caroline Kuhl’s situation feel the need to submit such 
a document, knowing that her fixed-term contractual relationship was bound to end 
anyway once her year of service had ended? Moreover, why did Jhering, of all things, 
turn to the police for help when the contractual dispute arose between him and his 
maidservant, a reaction which seems odd if not downright excessive? The answers 
to these questions lie in Jhering’s particular notion of his relationship with Caroline 
Kuhl as an employee. In his opinion, it was not governed by private law, as might 
be expected, but by gesinderecht (manorial law), a curious mixture of civil, admin-
istrative and criminal law, applicable to menial and farm workers throughout large 
parts of Germany. Among the various laws codifying gesinderecht, the prussian 
gesindeordnung of 1810 stands out. Together with its ancillary laws, it “was of 
substantive validity […] far beyond its territorial scope”. In the rhine province 
west of the Grand Duchy, it had even been formally enacted. Jhering’s apparent 
belief in the applicability of the Prussian gesindeordnung in the city of Gießen is 
expressed, albeit indirectly, in statements he made during the trial and in the Vienna 
lecture. His simultaneous assumptions, all contrary to ius commune, of a duty of 
termination on behalf of his former maidservant, fixed periods of notice and the 
existence of special police prerogatives in the matter very clearly point to a flawed 
instance of rechtsgefühl on his part. In reality, however, relationships between 
servants and masters in Gießen were not subject to gesinderecht, but only to the 
rules of contract according to ius commune. This was admitted, albeit reluctantly, 
by Jhering’s own witness, police commissioner Nover. He maintained that periods 
of notice were “customary” in open-ended contracts, but not a matter of positive 
law; in fixed-term contracts, on the other hand, they were virtually unknown. Quite 
ironically, Jhering, a great expert in Roman law, had supplanted them in his mind 
with a fantasy of a common gesinderecht and continued to do so even in 18727.
Jhering’s preference for the universal over the particular can also be observed 
in other cases. In 1862, he gave two expert opinions on behalf of the Swiss city of 
Basel in its litigation against its neighbouring canton regarding the ownership rights 
of the city’s former fortifications (Basler Schanzenstreit)8. The Swiss Federal Tri-
bunal ultimately decided in favour of Basel. Its verdict, however, was not based on 
the belligerent opinions delivered by Jhering and his colleagues on the intricacies 
of public property law according to ius commune, but on the interpretation of an 
 Wilhelm Kähler counted no fewer than 59 manorial legislations, 16 of which in Prussia, see W. Kähler: 
gesindewesen und gesinderecht in Deutschland, Jena 1896, p. 107.
 Th. Vormbaum: Politik und gesinderecht im 19. jahrhundert, vornehmlich in Preußen, 1810–1918, berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot 1980, p. 169, with reference to W. Kähler: gesindewesen und gesinderecht in Deutschland, 
Jena 1896, p. 219.
 Protokollabschrift der Zeugenaussage lorenz novers, 29 September 1864, SUB Göttingen Cod. Ms. Jhering 
10:2 (16).
7 r. von Jhering: Der Kampf um’s recht, Vienna 1872, p. 55.
8 w. Kundert: Der Basler Schanzenstreit von 1859/62, BZGA 73 (1973), pp. 157–194.
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earlier arbitration judgement between the parties. “The extensive expert opinions 
of the German jurists” to one of the Swiss judges:
“made it very difficult for the judge to perform his duty due to the manner of 
dissection and disintegration of the topics of the original judgement, the application 
of certain theories and the consequences derived from these theories, involving 
rather strange ideas in the process […]”9.
Eventually, he decided to “put aside all these opinions and focus on the word-
ing of the original judgement in order to grasp its meaning”70.
In the dispute over the Basel fortifications, the marginal role played by the 
pandectist school’s rechtswissenschaft could still be downplayed. After all, it was 
eventually on the winning side — if one accepted Jhering’s side to be the only truly 
scientific one, which he himself certainly did71. yet the fact that the arcane debates 
between Jhering and his colleagues Dernburg, Keller and Rüttimann, concerning 
Roman law “did not interest the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the least”72, as marie 
Theres Fögen put it, was obvious to those who read the court’s reasoning.
In this respect, the case of Kuhl v. jhering, which, quite contrary to the Swiss 
case, was tried before a ius commune court, was rather similar; this time, however, 
the great Mandarin was defeated. In Gießen, his deliberations were not on property 
law but on contract law, and they were disregarded by the court not because they 
were deemed inapplicable, but because he did not succeed in proving his claims and 
had not complied with the timeframes in place. Obviously, Jhering did not manage 
to cope with the transition from the big picture of international arbitration to the 
much smaller sphere in the provincial capital of Gießen, nor was he able to switch 
from being a legal expert to being a defendant in a civil action. Because he did not 
even recognize that such manoeuvres were required, he eventually lost the goodwill 
of the court which had, throughout the proceedings, been quite sympathetic to his 
cause. This experience clearly formed the background to his scathing criticism of 
the traditional epistemology of law, put forward in 1872, which, in his opinion, 
contained:
“an error pregnant with the most ominous consequences imaginable, because 
it feeds man with hope where he should act, and act with a full and clear conscious-
ness of the object aimed at, and with all his strength. It feeds him with the hope, that 
9 “…dem Richter seine Aufgabe sehr erschwert durch die Art und Weise der Behandlung des Gegenstandes, 
durch die Zergliederung und Zersetzung der Orte des Urtheils, durch Unterstellung desselben unter gewisse Theo-
rien, und durch die Folgerungen welche man aus diesen Theorien wieder ableitete, und wobei man ganz fremdar-
tige Anschauungen hineingezogen hat” (in:) Der rechtsstreit über die Basler festungswerke. Bericht der Delegir-
ten der h. regierung von Baselstadt, Vorträge der Parteien, referat des Instructionsrichters, Verhandlungen und 
urtheil des h. Bundesgerichtes über die ansprüche des Kantons Baselland an den Basler festungswerken, vom 28. 
und 29. october 1862, nebst zwei Beilagen, Basel 1862, p. 105.
70 Ibidem.
71 m.th. fögen: lob der Pandektistik (in:) R.M. Kiesow, R. Ogorek, S. Simitis (eds.): Summa. Dieter Simon 
zum 70. geburtstag, Frankfurt am Main 2005, pp. 179–205, 187.
72 Ibidem, p. 194.
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things will take care of themselves and that the best he can do, is to fold his arms 
and confidently wait for what may gradually spring to light from that primitive source 
of all law called the natural conviction of legal right”7.
Apart from his blind confidence in the workings of Volksgeist, rejected so 
vividly in subsequent years, Jhering’s disregard for particularity is the most striking 
finding in Kuhl v. jhering. For Jhering, small-scale law, controlled without exception 
from the macro level, could have absolutely no significance of its own; learned law 
always prevailed. It is highly ironic that Jhering argued with gesinderecht when he 
should have done so on the grounds of ius commune, thus implying that the mano-
rial law for servants was on the same epistemological level with the Roman sources. 
In The Struggle for law, he maintained this astonishing position, as seen in the 
famous sentence: “When the master can no longer insist that the servant shall do his 
duty — in other words: enforce the gesindeordnung, — when the creditor cannot 
enforce payment on his debtor, when the public attach no great importance to the 
correctness of weights and measures, can it be said that nothing is imperilled but 
the authority of the law?”7.
. whose struggle?
A sudden change in the environment of an individual, calling into question one’s 
accustomed views of oneself and one’s ways of dealing with things in one’s immedi-
ate surroundings and in the world at large, is known as “breaking frame”, a concept 
introduced by the sociologist Erving Goffman in 19747. When a person, “for what-
ever reason, […] breaks frame and perceives he has done so”, he maintains:
“the nature of his engrossment and belief suddenly changes. Such reservations 
as he had about the ongoing activity are suddenly disrupted, and, momentarily at 
least, he is likely to become intensively involved with his predicament; […] He 
loses command over the formulation of viable response. He flounders”7.
Jhering’s hapless actions may well be understood against the backdrop of his 
surprising and disturbing experiences during the trial, again according to Goffman, 
as a form of “involvement”, a situation “of being carried away into something — in 
a word, engrossment” without any “means of distinguishing strips of untransformed 
activity from transformed ones”77, established patterns of action and expectation in 
an accustomed life as a professor as distinct from the drama of the courtroom.
7 r. von Jhering: The Struggle for law, Chicago 1879, p. 13.
7 r. von Jhering: The Struggle…, op. cit. (transl. from the fifth German edition by John J. Lalor), p. 69, follo-
wing R. von Jhering: Der Kampf um’s recht, Vienna 1872, p. 55. Unchanged in later editions.
7 E. Goffman: frame analysis, New york 1977, pp. 345 et seq.
7 Ibidem, pp. 378 et seq.
77 Ibidem, p. 347.
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Jhering experienced the failure of the historicist paradigm of law in a very 
personal and painful way. Instead of confirming people’s “real life” experience with 
their established notions of top and bottom of society, the legal process yielded 
a completely unexpected result. In a trial of civil law, a person of the lowest social 
order, and a woman at that, prevailed against a police commissioner, a ruling judge, 
a priest — and even more importantly — against science itself, embodied in Jhering’s 
own person. The verdict, which mocked all certainties regarding power relations 
and gender roles and which empirically proved that law was not subject to historical 
inevitability, but was first and foremost a matter for the courts, seems to have genu-
inely horrified Jhering. This may seem strange, as the second edition of geist des 
römischen rechts, whose completely revised introductory chapter dealt with the 
very same problems, was near completion at the time of the trial. The verdict with 
its sudden and very public confirmation of the theoretical findings on the role of 
“life” in law, however, seems to have made a lasting impression on him.
Now, in conclusion, let us return to the question posed at the beginning: whose 
struggle was it? Who fought the original struggle for law? As we have seen, Jhering’s 
remarks in the Vienna lecture on his former opponent are far from flattering; in the 
final version, published in 1872, she is not even mentioned. And yet there are good 
reasons why Caroline Kuhl can be identified as the hidden leading character in The 
Struggle for law. It was her who fought for her rights against the perceived wisdom 
of the popular spirit and the logic of organicist development. It was her who fought 
for her “hard-earned wages” committing her entire personality, courage and deter-
mination. Her fight, if we follow Jhering’s reasoning, was instrumental not only in 
her achieving her personal right, and thus in becoming a true personality, but also 
in attaining objective law. Finally, her fight and her victory against all odds comprised 
the core and starting point for Jhering’s theoretical work on Kampf um’s recht and, even 
more importantly, on Der Zweck im recht (Law as a means to an end). Thus, Caroline 
Kuhl, represented by the formidable Wilhelm Curtman, may be rightly seen as 
the true heroine of Jhering’s literary bestseller, one of only a few law books from the 
nineteenth century with real global significance. Unsung until today, 145 years after 
the publication of The Struggle for law, she deserves to be remembered as such.
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S u m m a r y
In 1864 and 1865, during close to a year and a half, the famous German law professor 
and renowned legal expert, Rudolf von Jhering, was caught up in a civil action in his then 
hometown of Gießen. It had been brought against him by his former maidservant, a certain 
Caroline Kuhl, who sued him for three months’ wages. years later, towards the end of his 
tenure in Vienna, Jhering vividly recalled this trial as a prime example of some of the 
deficiencies and absurdities of modern law which he so scathingly criticised. In the published 
version of Der Kampf um’s recht, which appeared in 1872, however, there is not the slightest 
mention either of Kuhl or the lawsuit she dared to bring — and win — against one of the 
greatest lawyers of the century.
This paper presents a historical reconstruction of Kuhl v. jhering based on the court 
papers from Jhering’s estate preserved at the Staats- und universitätsbibliothek (SUB) 
Göttingen, followed by an assessment of Jhering’s actions and behaviour before and during 
the trial. It finishes with a discussion of the lawsuit’s significance as a provider of ideas and, 
indeed, a prequel to Jhering’s single most successful work Der Kampf um’s recht, one of 
the few 19th century law books with a real global reach, which is still popular today.
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